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ABSTRACT: Ever since the economic reforms started two decades ago, India has been trying to 
lead  the  developing  nations  in  terms  of  building  their  infrastructure.  The  challenge  of 
government‟s fund constraint has been tried to put behind by allowing flow of funds   from private 
sources with regulatory control in government own hand. However, with the global economic 
crisis that had knocked heavily at the doors of Indian economy too during last couple of years, it 
was found that developmental bottlenecks for  infrastructure sector has escalated in spite of the 
best efforts by the government.  
Arranging of Debt and equity capitals are major financial investment concerns for infrastructure 
developers  today.  While  studies  reveal  that  issues  like  land  acquisition,  utility  shifting, 
discrepancies  in  DPR,  state  support  agreements,  dispute  resolutions  are  still  considered  to  be 
critical for an infrastructure development projects, more recently the loose ends at the financial 
structures of many projects are posing as more vulnerable threats. Especially in the period of 
economic recession, the financial organizations have tightened their hands and as a result project 
cash flows are affected at halfway round. As the investment retrieval periods are going to be 
prolonged, the investors are facing uncertainty on their assured return. The commercial banks 
which had already reached their sectarian limits; still tried to backed promoters with decent track 
records, with clearances in place and well defined business plans. However, very few projects 
could achieve financial closure during past two years. The participation rates in recent biddings of 
PPP projects are also not encouraging, especially in Highway sector. More recently, there have 
been reports of NHAI favoring for moving back to the old EPC mode. 
Salient features of few case studies of Indian projects have highlighted that there is no project 
specific debt equity ratio and it may differ from project to project.  Study by the authors also 
reveals that availability of debt in India is Sector specific and projects are still being supported 
with generous government grant varying upto 70% in case of Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JnNURM) schemes. However, the principal concern remains for retrieval of at 
least 20% return on the investment by the private party. A fair bidding, a robust agreement and the 
well  planned  pre-constructional  activities  can  be  beneficial  to  all  the  stack  holders  of  the 
infrastructure development project. 
But whatever be the planning, with the complexity of multiple issues involved for choice of funds, 
one has to keep in mind that investments in infrastructures are non-recourse in nature. At the same 
time  the  sharing  of  responsibilities  in  a  pre-framed  manner  proves  to  be  successful  in  many 
occasions for the participants concerned and reflect a win-win situation for all. 
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1.  Introduction: 
Government‟s  fund  crunch  has  been  a  major  constrict  for  infrastructural  development  of 
developing countries like India. Traditionally, the onus of providing basic infrastructure has been 
with the Governments and users have been utilizing the facilities without any extra charge to the 
government for providing that particular infrastructure. However, with the entry of Private sector 
in the infrastructure development as a co-partner or in capacity of an individual developer, the user 
is compelled for paying the usages charges. In most of the cases, these charges directly value to 
the cost of developing and maintaining that special infrastructure which is being used by that 
particular user who is paying for it. 
At this point, a primary question may arise as to why a particular user would spend or pay some 
extra charges for using a particular infrastructure even though primarily or traditionally it was the 
responsibility  of  government  to  provide  such  facility  to  the  public  or  for  that  matter  to  that 
individual user out of the taxes paid by him. The answer to this question is rather simple, the 
infrastructure  developer  or  the  facilitator  is  facilitating  the  public  with  such  a  quality  of 
infrastructure that the user would be bound to save some of his earnings by using that particular 
infrastructure and not choosing to use any other alternatives and thereby pays few extra charges to 
the facilitator out of his savings. 
So, for an appropriate pricing, the quality of infrastructure is absolutely critical; otherwise the user 
may not be whole heatedly willing to pay and problems of revenue collection gets started there 
itself. Even after successful commissioning of a project, the problem of toll   collection may 
jeopardize in achieving the ultimate goal. A golden example in this connection is Coimbatore 
Bypass Road Project in India [1], wherein unwillingness of the users to pay the toll has led to 
lengthy litigation with the developer L&T 
A rational  pricing mechanism on the other hand, has  to  take into consideration the basics of 
financing pattern of the infrastructure to be developed and the uncertainties involves in the same. 
As a matter of fact, pricing and financing of infrastructure particularly in a private participating 
environment is complementary to each other. While one must understood that financial viability of 
an  infrastructure  project  is  largely  dependent  on  the  effective  pricing  mechanism;  the  pricing 
structure itself has to adjust depending upon availability of funds. 
In  this  paper,  a  brief  assessment  of  the  various  issues  relating  to  financing  and  charging  of 
infrastructure facility is being presented along with brief findings of twelve (12) case studies. 
 
2.  Definition: 
By definition pricing means  the charges  which the users  pay directly  to  the facilitator of the 
particular infrastructure for using the facility availed to him. Charges are levied for (i) retrieving 
the investment made by the facilitator or in few other cases (ii) to limit the use of a particular 
infrastructure thereby encouraging for optimal use and reduce congestion. eg. Road Pricing, as a 
tool to mitigate traffic congestion is used mostly in developed countries for urban areas, where as 
in developing countries it is used a measure to recover the investment, partially or totally for both 
urban and rural areas. In urban areas pricing for parking facilities is basically aimed at reducing 
congestion [2]. However, in this present context the main focus is primarily retrieval of investment 
by the developer concerned. 
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By “Financing”, however focus is on some decisions relating to choice of funds, particularly debt 
and equity source of financing. The goal of the financing mechanism should be such that it allows 
the sponsors to borrow funds to finance a project without increasing their liabilities beyond their 
investment in the project. 
3.  Need: 
It is the essential need of today‟s world that an infrastructure project is developed through private 
participation. However, it must be noted that user will be willing to pay only and only if he gets a 
better  quality  infrastructure  through  which  he  can  earn  some  savings.      Traditionally,  these 
investments were flowing through limited nozzles to other important social and primary sectors 
which otherwise could not be given due importance due to fund source crunch. Nevertheless, with 
availability of regulated private fund development process has been getting a push for overall 
advancement of the economy.  
Conversely,  the  impact  of  global  economic  recession  has  already  raised  turbulence  in  Indian 
economy too. Therefore, it is felt to address the critical issues relating to pricing and financing 
mechanism of infrastructure in India on a priorities basis.  
4.  Infrastructure domestic market: 
The pent up demand for infrastructure services is substantial in developing countries. It has been 
observed  that  in  most  of  the  Asian  countries  level  of  infrastructure  services  supply  has  been 
outpaced  by  demand.  Given,  the  constraints  on  public  budgets,  focus  is  to  increases  in 
infrastructure investments through private sector participation. So, a balance pricing mechanism is 
also essentially required, which can be adopted basically for marketing these infrastructures. In 
most  of  the  countries,  the  domestic  market  far  exceeds  the  international      market  in  case  of 
infrastructure.  
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Exhibit 1: Total Infrastructure investment breakup into public and private investment – 11
th 
Five Year Plan (Actual) 
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In India, sector-wise projected infrastructure Investment during the Twelfth Five Year Plan are 
tabulated in Table 1.      
        
Table 1:  Projected Infrastructure Investment during the Twelfth Five Year Plan  
(Rs. Crore at 2006-07 prices) 
 
Year 
Base 
Year  2012-13  2013-14  2014-15  2015-16  2016-17  Total 12
th 
Plan 
(2011-12) 
GDP at market prices (Rs. Crore)  63,14,265  68,82,549  75,01,978  81,77,156  89,13,100  97,15,280  4,11,90,064 
Rate of Growth of GDP (%)  9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
Infrastructure GCF as % of GDP  8.37  9  9.5  9.9  10.3  10.7  9.95 
Infrastructure GCF (Rs. Crore)  5,28,316  6,19,429  7,12,688  8,09,538  9,18,049  10,39,595  40,99,240 
Infrastructure GCF (US $ 
BILLION) @ Rs. 40/$  132.08  154.56  178.17  202.38  229.51  259.88  1,024.81 
Source : Planning Commission Conference, March 2010 
 
As per preliminary assessment, investment in infrastructure during XIIth plan would be of the 
order of about Rs.40,99,240 crore (US $ 1025 billion) to achieve a share of 9.95% as proportion of 
GDP. The provision of world-class infrastructure would not only be necessary for improving the 
competitiveness of the Indian economy but also for promoting inclusive growth and improving the 
quality  of  life  of  the  common  man.  The  on  an  average  the  investment  in  infrastructure 
development in XIth plan was 7.5% of GDP as  
 
Table 2: Revised projected investment as percentage of GDP 
(Rs. Crore at 2006-07 prices) 
 
Years 
Tenth 
Plan  
(Actual) 
Base year 
of XI Plan  
(2006-07) 
(Actual) 
2007-08  
(Actual) 
2008-09  
(Actual/Est.) 
2009-10  
(RE/BE/Proj.) 
2010-11 
(BE/Projected) 
2011-12  
(Proj) 
Total 
Eleventh 
Plan 
GDP at 
market 
prices  1,78,40,877  42,83,979  47,17,187  50,03,545  53,63,800  57,92,904  63,14,265  2,71,91,700 
Public 
Investment  6,94,006  1,73,676  1,99,539  2,38,054  2,62,963  2,90,832  3,19,904  13,11,293 
Private 
Investment  2,25,220  70,819  1,04,268  1,21,138  1,39,866  1,69,227  2,08,413  7,42,912 
Total 
Investment  9,19,225  2,44,495  3,03,807  3,59,192  4,02,829  4,60,059  5,28,316  20,54,205 
Investment as percentage of GDP 
Public 
Investment  2.89  4.05  4.23  4.76  4.9  5.02  5.07  4.82 
Private 
Investment  1.26  1.65  2.21  2.42  2.61  2.92  3.3  2.73 
Total 
Investment  5.15  5.71  6.44  7.18  7.51  7.94  8.37  7.55 
Source : GDP data for Tenth Plan, 2007-08 and 2008-09 are from CSO, GDP growth rates for 
2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 have been assumed as 7.2%, 8% and 9% respectively. 
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Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  infrastructure,  a  comparatively  new  phenomenon  that  had 
presented  tremendous  opportunity  for  the  investors  and  governments,  has  no  more  remained 
cheap. Many countries in past have successfully attracted and benefited from substantial efficiency 
gains by FDI. However, looking at the present economic environment there is need to take a 
cautious approach [3,4,5]. 
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        Exhibit 2: Investment Profile in Infrastructure from 2006-2012. 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Total Infrastructure investment breakup into public and private investment – 12
th 
Five Year Plan (Projected) 
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5.  Project Cost Appraisal: 
As  in  any  construction  related  project,  an  infrastructure  development  project  has  following 
principal cost components, namely (i) Pre-Investment costs, (ii) Bidding and Procurement Related 
Costs, (iii) Project Development cost (iv) Construction Cost, (v) Operating and Maintenance Costs 
and (vi) Termination Costs [9]. However, in a particular project all the above components may 
involve or may not also depending upon situation and project proposal. Once the total project cost 
has been set forth, based on the above expenditures to be incurred in various phases of project 
development, the detailed Cost Benefit analysis is dealt with along with sensitivity analysis. 
Based on the results, the most likely IRR and NPV for the project for a particular schedule of 
investments can be gathered and a decision may be taken for either to for the investment or to 
back track. In other words going by Sorkin‟s view “A typical decision rule is that one should 
undertake the investment if the IRR is equal to or higher than the market rate of interest. Those 
projects with the highest IRR may be given priority in terms of funding.” However, from the 
investor‟s point of view he will see that there is maximum cushion between market rate of interest 
and his IRR [6,7]. 
For a typical Indian highway road project on annuity basis, where government takes the revenue 
risk, the project IRR is expected at around 12-14% and equity IRR would be 14-16%; while for 
full toll basis projects where concessionaire are taking the revenue risk the project IRR is expected 
at 14-16% and equity IRR around 18-20% [8]. 
6.  Financing Structure of an Infrastructure Project:  
It is worthy to understand at this point that an appropriate pricing mechanism will have to take 
care of both (i) project  cost-benefit as well as (ii) uncertainties in project financing so that a 
project can reflect a win-win situation for all the parties and hence, how the financial structure of 
the project is framed is a matter of great importance. Particularly, in private party participating 
environment, it becomes a more concerning factor.  
In case of private participation in infrastructure development, the basic model adopted is 
BOT (Build Operate and Transfer), in which a contractual agreement is made between the host/ 
government and the contractor /concessionaire for undertaking construction, financing, operating 
and maintaining the infrastructure facility within a specified period of time called concession 
period. Within that concession period the concessionaire is allowed to levy/ collect charge from 
the user which is called toll. After the specified period of concession, he has to transfer the right of 
the infrastructure to the host/ government. Exhibit: 4 depict the main parties involved in a PPP, 
BOT project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 4: Main parties involved BOT/ PPP basic model 
HOST GOVT. 
PROJECT 
SPONSORS 
/DEVELOPER 
OTHER SHARE  
-HOLDERS 
CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTOR 
BANKS/ 
LENDERS  
 
         34    Journal of Management and Science           ISSN: 2249-1260 | e-ISSN: 2250-1819 | Vol.4. No.2 | June’2014                                                   
 
BOT financing, like other project financing, involves the funding of the project on the merit of the 
project itself but to a much greater degree than the conventional project financing. Typically, in 
such financing, a separate project company namely Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is established 
by the project sponsors to implement the project. The SPV allows the sponsors to borrow funds to 
finance a project without increasing their liabilities beyond their investment in the project. Thus, 
their balance sheet shows equity capitals at risk and nothing more. 
BOT financing is essentially a contract financing, which focuses on viability and security of a 
given project‟s revenue stream. It is important to notice that the lenders will provide / arrange 
capitals for the project keeping in view the likely revenue earnings of the project. In most of the 
cases, flexibility towards revenue earnings means becomes limited and hence, the lenders are left 
with no other choice but to play with their borrowing interest rates; which at times if not girded by 
proper contractual frame-work may pose as a serious threat to the whole project.    
7.  Types of Capitals:  
Broadly speaking, there are three types of capital available to all projects:  Equity, Debt and 
Mezzanine  capital.  Each  plays  a  specific  role  in  project  financing  and  has  got  its  own  risk 
characteristics and eventually determines the return on it. 
7.1  Equity Capital:  
It is the lowest ranking capital of all, in terms of its claims on the assets of a project. It represents 
the fund injected by the owners of the project. If somehow, the project fails, all other claims must 
be made before any claims of equity investors. Equity investors are the biggest risk taker of the 
project and thus, the terms of contracts must compensate these investors fairly.  
7.2  Debt Capital: 
In contrast to equity capital, debt capitals of the project have highest rankings among all capitals. 
Senior debt has first claim over all the assets of a project and must be repaid first, according to a 
predetermined schedule. Only after the claims of senior debt are satisfied can the claims of others 
be considered. As such, senior debt  bears the lowest  risk of all capital.  Correspondingly, the 
returns to senior debt are usually limited to just the interest payments on the loans; irrespective of 
how successful the project may be i.e. lower risk is born by lower returns.  
7.3  Mezzanine Capital: 
Mezzanine  capital  is  a  more  flexible  instrument  than  either  pure  equity  or  debt.  The  key 
characteristic of mezzanine capital is that it has both debt and equity features and as such, has a 
risk  profile  that  is  somewhere  in-between  debt  and  equity  capital.  Examples  of  mezzanine 
financing are subordinated loans and preferential shares. Both have the characteristics of debt, in 
that  regular  payments  of  interest  and  /  or  capital  are  involved.  However,  payments  are 
subordinated to senior debt and need only be made when project funds are available. When they 
are not available, mezzanine financing is treated like equity and no payments are made; to that 
end, mezzanine financing provides projects with an additional equity cushion. However, when 
funds are available, mezzanine payments take precedence over any distributions to equity capital, 
such as dividend payments. Thus, while mezzanine financing is sub-ordinate to senior debt, it is 
still senior to equity capital.  
7.4  Choice of Capitals:  
All things being equal, equity investors would prefer a debt/equity ratio as high as possible, while 
creditors would prefer a debt/equity ratio as low as possible. A higher ratio reduces the risks 
exposure of equity investors, while increasing the potential returns to their capital, while a lower 
ratio increases the certainty that loans will be repaid and hence lowers the risk to creditors. From 
the standpoint a project company, however, the higher the debt/equity ratio, the less sound would 
be its financial structure and the more vulnerable it would be to deterioration in the business 
environment.   
 
         35    Journal of Management and Science           ISSN: 2249-1260 | e-ISSN: 2250-1819 | Vol.4. No.2 | June’2014                                                   
There are no hard and fast rules as to the correct or best debt / equity ratio. This will change from 
sector to sector and from country to country. Suffice it to say that the higher the risks, the lower 
should be the debt/equity ratio. But whatever the ratio, care must be taken to ensure that it is 
prudent, in the light of prevailing project and market conditions [9].  
 
8.  Sources of Financing: 
Debt, equity and mezzanine capital are usually provided by different sources. Where a single 
source provides more than one type of capital, the different types of capital may be handled by 
separate departments. In the first instance, equity capital for a project will come from the project 
sponsors, or other investors that have an active interest in the project. Additional equity, if needed, 
would be sought from passive sources, such as institutional investors and possibly the general 
public through local or international capital markets. 
Commercial banks are the most traditional source of debt financing. To a lesser extent, they are 
also providers of mezzanine capital. However, one key characteristic of commercial banks (as 
compared  to  universal  banks  which  combine  the  functions  of  both  commercial  and  merchant 
banking) are primarily short to medium term floating rate deposits. To avoid problems of interest 
rate  and  term  miss-match,  most  commercial  bank  loans  are  primarily  short  to  medium  term 
floating rate credits (normally three to five year terms and rarely longer than seven years). Long 
term credits in excess of seven to eight years account for a fairly small percentage of a bank‟s 
asset  portfolio,  while  equity  investments  are  negligible  to  non-existing,  either  by  choice  or 
regulation. For this reason, the activities of commercial banks are focused primarily on earning a 
margin between the interest rate they receive on loans and the interest rate they pay on deposits. 
They have little or no interest in equity investments. If the creditworthiness of borrowers, or the 
mortgage  provided  on  loans  is  found  less  than  satisfactory,  commercial  banks  used  to  seek 
assurances  from  more  creditworthy  third  parties,  such  as  guarantees  from  parent  companies, 
governments, or quasi-government agencies. For these reason, sponsors are increasingly looking 
to sources beyond commercial banks to meet their long term funding needs and using commercial 
banks primarily to meet their shorter term funding needs, such as working capital and construction 
financing [9].  
9.  The Indian Scenario:  
In the first three years of eleventh plan, budgetary support constituted ~45% of total infrastructure 
spending. The debt from Commercial banks, NBFCs, Insurance companies and external sources 
constitute ~41% of funding while the balance 14% funding through equity and FDI. 
 
Exhibit 5: Sources of funding for Infrastructure investment in eleventh plan. 
A survey conducted by World Bank for 104 no. projects (1995-2007), reveals that senior debt 
accounted for 68% of project financing, while 3% is from subordinated debt, 25% from equity and 
4% viability gap funding on an average. Out of these, about 70% of senior debt is provided by 
commercial banks, four-fifths by public sector banks. Rest around 23% debt financing came from 
institutional lenders and 5% from International finance Corporations.  
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On the equity side about 80% comes from project developers with next largest contributor being 
the public sector. Strategic investors (Foreign direct investment) made direct equity investment in 
the Special purpose vehicle established to implement the PPPs for only limited projects. Though 
FDI in PPP infrastructure projects is very low, it may be noted that ports sector has been high in 
attracting  FDI  (in  terms  of  value)  followed  by  Airports,  Road  &  Bridges  and  Solid  Waste 
Management. It may also be noted that FDI cases are more in those sectors like Ports & Airports 
where operational expertise doesn‟t exist with Indian developers and FDI has come from Strategic 
Foreign Investors. 
 
 
Exibit 6: FDI in various sector of infrastructure in India upto 2007. 
However, for twelfth five year plan, planning commission is projecting an investment of Rs. 51 
lakh crores. About 53% of this is expected to be funded through budgetary support and rest will 
need to come from private sector funding. For the huge funding gap of twelfth plan, it needs to 
channelize an additional private sector investment of about Rs. 6.08 lakh crores over the duration 
of the plan. This is a big challenge and will not be possible without the radical reforms and public 
awareness [10,26]. 
 
Exhibit 7: Estimate funding gap for Twelfth Plan 
 
10.  Few Case Studies: 
In order to understand the financing and pricing and other issues relating to an infrastructure 
project development in a better way, case study findings of following 12 (Twelve) projects are 
highlighted in brief hereunder.  
 
 
 
Rupees in 
Crores  
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10.1   Terminal T3 of Delhi Airport:  
The  GMR‟s  Terminal  T3  of  Delhi  Airport,  which  was  inaugurated  in  July,  2010  has  been 
considered as a successful project execution model for Public-Private Partnership in India. The 
building having 502,000sqm floor area, nine levels, 78 aerobridges, 63 elevators, 34 escalators and 
with a passenger handling capacity of 34 million per year was completed in a record time of 37 
months and significantly before schedule time. It cost Rs.127 billion and the work was undertaken 
by a Joint Venture (JV) Company namely Delhi International Airport (Private) Limited (DIAL). 
The Bengaluru based India‟s leading infrastructure firm, GMR group has got the leading share of 
54%  followed  by  Airport  Authority  of  India  (AAI)  with  26%,  Frankfurt  Airport  Services 
Worldwide and Eraman Malaysia with 10% each. The project was executed under Build Own 
Operate and Transfer (BOOT) scheme with 30 years concession period extendable to another 30 
years. 
 
In the sideline of T3 construction DIAL has set up a 10MW power plant to generate power from 
solid waste under a partnership between GMR energy Ltd. and SELCO International Ltd. This 
was expected to put an end to blackout of the Airport as well as solve the problem of disposal of 
municipal  solid  waste  of  Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  (MCD).  DIAL  has  also  set  up  300 
rainwater harvesting structure in the airport area to recharge the ground water resources which 
would fulfill the water requirement of the Airport. 
The T3 housed 163 check-in counters and 95 immigration counters with state of art baggage 
handling and security system in place; these can handle large number of domestic and foreign 
passengers at a time. The baggage handling system could handle 12800 begs per hour. It has got 
comfortable lounges, nap and shower rooms, massage and SPA services, gamming zone and a 100 
room transit hotel. It has housed world renowned restaurants, bars, food centers, coffee shops etc. 
It has also got premium class sopping area of around 20,000 sqm retail area. 
The terminal is well connected with eight lane road leading to NH-8 and Delhi Metro express 
service in 18 minutes time. The multi level car parking facility of the terminal is another important 
aspect, which reduces the entry and exit time considerably. 
Summing  up  T3  has  created  a  global  bench  mark  in  construction  of  Airport  terminal.  It  has 
become the world 8
th largest Airport in terms of floor area, yet constructed in a record time of 37 
months. The construction activities were carried out by 200 contractors at the peak level and as 
many as by 37000 workers, who came from different parts of India and abroad [11]. 
However, the initiation for developing this Airport with private participation was not smooth; it 
saw stiff opposition first from Government‟s left partners in 2006 and similar resistance from 
majority of AAI employees. Never the less, with Government shear motive towards facilitating the 
National capital with a world class Air terminal, T3 has come up within a short span. In the 
financial  front  also  everything  has  been  arranged  and  running  smoothly  except  some  recent 
concerning repots of default by few Private Airlines. However, the government got a severe jolt 
when CAG reported non-fair allocation of the bid as well as low concessional lease of the land to 
the  DIAL.  Where  as,  CAG  has  estimated  potential  earnings  of  Rs163557  Crore,  GMR  led 
consortium would get Rs. 88,337 crore. 
 
10.2   Cochin International Airport: 
It was the novel venture in the history of civil aviation in India. It was the first Airport in India, 
which  was  built  outside  the  ambit  of  Government  of  India.  A  company  named  Cochin 
International Airport Limited (CIAL) with major share holding by Government of Kerala (GOK). 
Initially GOK was supposed to participate upto an equity share of 51%. However, hitch off at 
arranging the funds have restricted them in mere 39.85% till now.   
 
         38    Journal of Management and Science           ISSN: 2249-1260 | e-ISSN: 2250-1819 | Vol.4. No.2 | June’2014                                                   
GOK initially relied heavily on investment and donations from interested NRIs as well as from 
schemes  like  Kisan  Vikas  Patrika  (KVP).  CIAL  issued  shares  at  Rs10/-  ,  but  insisted  that 
individual  share  holders  apply  for  at  least  250  shares  worth  Rs2500/-.  Around  10000  NRIs 
invested in the Airport; single largest investment being Rs80/- million. The inflow of funds to this 
new airport showed credibility, though it has got competition from Kozhikode airport which has 
adopted the same model on suggestion of AAI. Through shares, a sum of only Rs40 million could 
be arranged as against expected Rs.20000 million. 
Land acquisition created initial hurdled in this project. However, court ruling favours CIAL and 
1300 acres of land was acquired from around 2600 landowners.  822 families were rehabilitated to 
their complete satisfaction @ Rs20,000/- per family for shifting of their personal belongings. Each 
family was given „six cents” land free of cost and the colony become known as “six cent colony”. 
The land losers have been accommodated in CIAL jobs as per norms. Over the time infrastructure 
of the area also developed along with the local economy. 
CIAL has faced great financial hardship right from its inception. Established in March, 1994 with 
an authorization capital of Rs900 million, it was to raise project equity capital of Rs7000 million 
and loan funds of Rs 1300 million. In March, 1995 HUDCO sanctioned a term loan of Rs250 
million @16.5% interest. GOK sanctioned Rs.270 million and after lot of persuasion Federal Bank 
Limited sanctioned a bridge loan of Rs100 million @15% for six months. GOK further sanctioned 
Rs.50 million towards equity, while Rs150 million came as private equity. However, the fund was 
still well short than required. On the other hand GOK did not want to loose its stake and instead 
decided to have 51% equity. For that they approach public sector oil companies, State Bank of 
Traveancore,  Federal  Bank  and  HUDCO.  This  way,  another  Rs200  million  was  arranged. 
Meanwhile,  CIAL  entered  into  some  memorandum  of  understanding  (MOUs)  with  AAI/  Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) in some technical issues relating to equipment supply and installation at the 
airport. These resulted in easy payment terms and conditions for CIAL and in few cases revenue 
sharing terms. 
 
For the economic viability of the project as a whole, CIAL had to take up several initiatives in its 
operational front. The old airport had to be closed down to divert air traffic to the new one. 
Similarly, the cargo complex which was biggest in India, had to be ultimately converted into a 80 
acre land cargo village in line with Dubai cargo village, to take care of large scale international 
cargo operations. The management of this cargo village was transferred from AI to CIAL [12]. 
The CIAL saw operational hurdles also in the form of breaking down of the MOU with AI, which 
resulted in delay in up gradation of navigational facilities. The issue of deployment of security 
staff /agency was another standoff. Similarly, adequate board representation by different quarters 
was another issue to be resolved. But above all failure of GOK to pay up its share capital of 51% 
led  to  diminishing  the  confidence  of  the  investors  and  the  NRIs,  who  felt  that  GOK  should 
contribute its full share before others. 
However,  the  positive  hope  is  that  with  a  major  share  of  India‟s  air  traffic  handling  to  Gulf 
countries and if proper restructuring of the financing is done it could evolve as a successful model 
as the debt service was feasible from the second year of operation. 
10.3   East West Metro Corridor Project of Kolkata Metro: 
The EWMC of Kolkata metro was conceived as comprising an underwater metro tunnel, 15 meter 
below river bed of Hooghly, few underground sections, and few elevated sections at median verge 
of roads. It is estimated that the entire project would require 22.60 hectare of land which includes 
21.52  hectare  as  government  land  and  the  rest  as  private  land.  The  land  acquisition  and 
rehabilitation, which is a problematic affair for Indian projects and particularly in state like West 
Bengal, has been seen as a critical issue for successful implementation of this project. The project 
proposal includes 4 numbers vehicular coaches of around 260 passengers each and the same to be  
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increased to 6 numbers in due course. The stations are to be made automated for all functions like 
fare collections, entry, exit and ticket checking etc. 
The KMRC suggested minimum fare of Rs.8 for a journey upto 2 Km and maximum being Rs.16, 
which is to be operated between 2 Km to 12 Km. This fare would be subjected to 12% escalation 
in every 2 years. 
Since, the project was for larger benefit to the society, the West Bengal govt. agreed to supply 
electricity on cost to cost basis with no profit charge. It was proposed that the state govt. would fix 
up electricity charge for this purpose. Thus, for calculating the financial internal return (FIRR) of 
the project, the power tariff has been taken as Rs.3.25 per unit. The project finance is proposed to 
come from state govt. (27.5%), Govt. of India (22.5%) and by raising 50% senior debt. With the 
estimated project cost and operational and maintenance cost to be incurred over time, the KMRC 
estimated that economic rate of return (ERR) would be in the range of 13.15% to 15.78%. The 
internal rate of return is expected in the range of 4.61% to 5.59%. However, going by the price 
sensitivity that commuters had shown in North South Corridor, some of the observer felt this 
project as a big gamble, which otherwise would take only 6 years to complete as against the 22 
years for the earlier (old) metro project in Kolkata [13]. 
10.4   The Delhi Metro Project: 
As  of  early  2006,  around  4,50,000  passengers  were  travelling  by  Delhi  Metro.  The  phase-I 
comprising of 3 (three) destinations lines, 59 stations and  totaling around 65 Km route came into 
existence within 8 years of starting of constructions and remarkably before schedule.  It is not that 
this project did not face technical and systematic challenges; however, thank goes to through 
planning, an effective project design, and a „we mean business‟ culture. Above all this culture was 
coupled with punctuality, honesty, and a strict adherence to the schedule deadlines. 
For  the  implementation  of  the  project,  Govt.  of  India  (GOI)  and  Govt.  of  National  Capital 
Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) set up a joint venture company 50:50 share, namely Delhi Metro Rail 
Corporation (DMRC).  
The phase-I of the project which was targeted to be completed within 10 years at the time of 
approval, was to cover 340 hectares of land which includes 58% government land, 39% private 
agricultural land and 3% private urban land. The total project cost was estimated at Rs. 60 billion 
initially and was later on revised to Rs.89.27 billion. Initially, for Phase-I to become viable, it was 
estimated that it would have to transport 2.2 million passengers per day and later on this was 
revised to 1.5 million per day. The EIRR of the project worked out to be 21.4% while the FIRR 
was less than 3%. In view of the low FIRR, initially some ministers in the GOI even suggested for 
dropping the project. However, others who had the views that this be treated as „social sector‟ 
project and likely to benefit the regional economy in more than one ways. Today, they appeared to 
be correct. 
 
 The financial plan for Phase-I was approved by GNCTD and GOI in 1996. Of the project cost, 
28% was to be financed by equity, subscribed to equally by the GOI and GNCTD.  The two 
governments  also  agreed  to  give  interest-free  subordinated  loans  to  cover  the  cost  of  land 
acquisition, which was expected to be 5% of the total project cost. Funding of major share of @ 
64% of project cost was to be provided by Overseas Economic Corporation Fund (OECF), which 
later become Japan Bank International Corporation (JBIC) through a time –sliced soft loan. JBIC 
disbursed the loan in tranches with each tranche treated as separate loan, with its own moratorium 
and repayment period. The repayment period of each tranche was set at 30 years, which includes 
10 years grace period. Property development at the highly lucrative sites around the metro stations 
was to generate remaining 3% of the project cost. The debt –equity ratio was fixed at 2:1. The 
GOI and GNCTD also decided to bear the exchange rate risk equally. 
The DMRC planned to repay OECF loan through surpluses from revenue, property development 
around the stations and its corridors, levies/taxes on the residents of Delhi. Further, the project was  
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exempted from custom and excise duties. It had already earned Rs. 1.5 billion revenue in the 
financial year ending 2006 and started repaying to JBIC as early as in 2007. However, the core 
factor behind the success storey of DMRC was the competent leadership of its first Managing 
Director, Mr. E. Sreedharan, who not only crated a dedicated team, but also taught them that what 
he means “business”. Delhi Metro is not only easing out the traffic scene in Delhi, but to a large 
extent it has benefited in reducing the environmental pollutions [14].  
10.5  Delhi Noida Bridge:  
The Delhi Noida Bridge is one of the three bridges across the river Yamuna connecting Noida 
with Delhi and the only one that is tolled. Popularly known as the DND flyway, the bridge is 
552.5 meter long and includes approach roads on both ends. It has got 8 (eight) lanes with capacity 
around 2,22,000 vehicles per day, which providing the commuters with saving of times, distance 
as well as fuel consumption limits. 
The bridge, which was opened for traffic in February 2001, was among the pioneer projects in the 
field of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in India. The project was structured as a Rs. 408.2 crore 
30 year BOOT concession, which was financed through equity of Rs. 122.4 crore and debt of Rs. 
285.8  crore.  Debt  financing  consisted  of  term  loans  from  various  Indian  banks  and  financial 
institutions totaling Rs. 235.8 crore and issue of deep discounted bonds totaling Rs. 0.50 crore by 
the Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited (the concessionaire). This project is often presented as a 
path breaking project which showed that private capital be indeed attracted to provide public 
better infrastructure services in India. Despite having to deal with multiple authorities and fragile 
political environment, the project was completed within budget and ahead of schedule. It was also 
successful in raising investment funds from capital markets including an issue of GDRs overseas. 
It is the only toll road in country listed on stock exchange. 
However, following the significant shortfall of projected traffic and revenues, it had to undergo 
financial restructuring for its debts in the first year of operations itself. Many termed it as an 
opportunistic favour to the private partner owing too much flexibility in the concession agreement 
which was actually among the first of its kind in India. On the other hand, the bidding process was 
not competitive in this case. The same party acted as project adviser as well as took the role of 
developer, thereby showed conflicting interest at different point of time. One of the major draw 
back in this concession agreement was not providing any role for the authority in assessing the 
reasonableness of capital and operational cost reported by the concessionaire. It also provided for 
guaranteed annual return of 20% on the total project costs, and not on equity alone. Shortfall in 
returns for previous years resulted in a corresponding increase in project cost, on which further 
returns were payable. As a result initial project cost of Rs. 408 crore has been escalated to Rs. 953 
crore as determined by the concessionaire as on 31
st March, 2006. Further, since the contract 
provides for extension till recovery of the total project cost and return thereon; the concessionaire 
noted that they are entitled for atleast 70 years concession as against initial 30 years. Moreover, 
they have received in-principle approval for right of developing of prime urban land (30.50 acres) 
in  NOIDA  as  a  supplementary  source  of  returns.  The  lenders  too  had  to  reschedule  their 
repayments and interest as well as lowered down few loan rates [15].  
10.6   Vadodara Halol Toll Road: 
The Vadodara Halol Toll Road (VHTR) was one of the first state Highway widening projects 
developed on a Public Private Partnership basis in India and it has subsequently paved the way for 
a large number of projects to be undertaken in similar format in Gujrat as well as rest of the 
country. The project, which was a part of vision 2010 of govt of Gujrat, involved widening of 32 
km of the existing two lane state highway (SH 87) connecting Vododara to the industrial town of 
Halol into a four lane tolled express highway.  
 
A SPV, namely Vadodara Hoalol Toll Road Limited (VHTRL) was constituted for this purpose 
with  principal  share holdings  by  govt.  of  Gujrat  and  IL  &FS. Other share holders  are O&M  
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operators and the financial institutions associated with the project development. Later on VHTRL 
has merged with the Ahmedabad Mehsana Toll Road Company Limited to form the Gujrat Road 
and Infrastructure Company Limited (GRICL) in 2005 as part of a financial restructuring. 
VHTRL  was  promoted  by  IL&FS  and  Govt  of  Gujrat  (GOG).  It  entered  into  a  concession 
agreement with GOG to design, finance, built, operate and maintain and transfer the facility after 
recovery  of  the  predetermined  return.  Thus  a  30  years  concession  period  from  the  date  of 
operation was agreed upon with 20% return on the project cost. It is extendable for further period 
of two years basis for shortfall in returns if duly certified by “Independent Auditor”. The project 
cost was estimated at Rs. 161 crores of which Rs. 119 crores is construction cost. Equity shares by 
GOG, IL &FS, American insurance groups etc. amounts to Rs. 67.90 crores. IL & FS raised debts 
through various banks (including IDBI) and financial institutions to the tune of Rs. 93.20 crores. 
The debt equity ratio is 58:42, while the project IRR was worked out as 20% and Equity IRR as 
32%. 
The  concessionaire  has  allotted  the  constructional  work  to  a  consortium  of  M/s  Punj  Lloyd 
Limited  and  IRCON  international  Ltd.  They  have  also  got  equity  stakes  in  VHTRL.  The 
development of the 31.7 Km stretch was achieved in a single phase with all required road works 
and  related  facility  being  developed.  The  schedule  completion  of  18  months  was  achieved  4 
months ahead. One of the key features of this project was its Environmental and social mitigation 
plan, which was effectively implemented in letter and spirit.  
The project, which was started in March, 1999 was completed in September, 2000 and tolling 
started from October, 2000. The Operation and Maintenance has got the following provisions: (i) 
Routine Maintenance (continuous); (ii) Periodic overlay (every five years); (iii) Periodic Renewal 
(Every  fifteen  years);  (iv)  Toll  Operation  and  Management  (once  a  year).  Toll  has  to  be 
determined, levied, collected, retained and appropriated from all the user of the facility. Toll rates 
are based on fixed formula and are allowed to increase annually based on consumer price index 
(CPI). 
Due to lower than projected toll collection and slippage of traffic, financial condition of VHTRL 
started deteriorating and it was unable to service its debt obligations. This resulted in the company 
resorting to corporate debt restructuring (CDR) in 2004. As per this the earlier SPV has merged 
with Ahmedabad Mehsana Toll Road Company Limited (AMTRL) to form a single entity Gujrat 
Road and Infrastructure Company Limited. GOG and IL &FS infused Rs. 30 crore each as fresh 
capital  in  2005  and  2006  respectively.  IL  &  FS  further  provided  irrevocable  line  of  credit 
amounting Rs. 100 crore as per CDR scheme for meeting shortfalls in debt services. IDFC as well 
as IL &FS component of the deep discounted bonds (DDBs) were restructured and some were 
converted to term loans under new entity. Interest on all term loans and other outstanding debts 
were reduced from contracted rates to 10% p.a. payable monthly. 
The Vododara Halol Toll Road was not awarded through competitive bidding and instead initiated 
from the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Govt. of Gujrat and IL & FS. The 
pre-development market study in this case is also proved to be not accurate. Hence, in spite of 
saving time and cost over run in construction, recovery of developmental cost has been proving as 
a major hurdle [16].  
10.7   Mumbai-Pune Expressway: 
The Mumbai Pune Expressway, officially the Yashwantarao Chavan Expressway is India‟s first 
six-lane concrete, high-speed, access controlled toll expressway. Its need was established with a 
study undertaken in seventh five year plan (1985-90) by MOST of GOI through RITES and Scott 
Wilson Kirkpatrick (UK). It spans a distance of 93 Km connecting Mumbai, the financial capital 
of India with the industrial and cultural hub of Maharastra, Pune. This expressway introduced new 
levels of speed and safety in automobile transportation to Indian roads. It has reduced travel time 
between Mumbai and Pune by approximately 2 hours.  
 
         42    Journal of Management and Science           ISSN: 2249-1260 | e-ISSN: 2250-1819 | Vol.4. No.2 | June’2014                                                   
The expressway has two carriageways with three lanes each separated by a central divider and a 
tarmac or concrete shoulder on either side. Vehicles with fewer than four wheels and agricultural 
tractors are not permitted, although tractor-trailers are permitted. The expressway handles about 
30,000 PCU daily, and is designed to handle 10,00,000 PCUs. 
Corridor planning was also done and road side facilities in a profitable environmentally sensitive 
manner  have  been  undertaken  with  a  view  to  maximize  commercial  utilization.  The  corridor 
belonged to NH-4. It has got adequate number of underpass and overpasses at required locations, 
provisions  of  subways  for  villagers  at  every  300  to  500  meter  distances,  five  tunnels  of 
international standards among others. It has also got provisions for 7000 trees plantation on both 
sides along with compound walls/ fencings on both sides of the expressway for safety of traffics. 
 
The original cost estimated for the project by RITES was Rs. 1146 crores. However, later on it is 
seen that with escalation the project cost would be Rs. 1630 crores. The government proposed to 
adopt 40% grant and 20% returns on the investment in this case. After poor participations in 
biddings  and  much  higher  quotes  of  M/s  Reliance  Corporation  (Rs.3600  crore);  Govt.  of 
Maharastra  decided  to  execute  it  through  Maharastra  State  Road  Development  Corporation 
(MSRDC) in BOT mode. Accordingly, 30 years concession was fixed for collection of tolls.  
The means of finance for MSRDC as on July, 1999 was: Rs 275 crores budgetary support from 
GOM and BMC, Rs. 548 crore loan from MMRDA, Rs. 107 crores bank loans, capital market 
borrowings and Bonds (rated AA) of Rs. 1897.6 crores. The GOM had guaranteed the bonds. As a 
result, the rate of interest in those bonds was low (~14%). The bonds were rated AA. It was 
proposed that toll collected from MSRD‟s projects would be used to pay the interest obligations of 
the  bonds.  It  was  estimated  that  during  initial  years  since  toll  collections  would  be  lower, 
alternative revenue source need to be considered such as sale of land along highway considered. 
For the purpose, MSRDC even laid telecom ducts along the sides of the expressway hoping that 
the same could be leased and additional revenue generated. This proved to be correct. 
The Mubai Pune Expressway is considered as a success storey and other state governments are 
also looking at activities of MSRDC. The other aspects which are dealt effectively by MSRDC are 
land acquisition of around 1000 ha land in project alignment apart from 1338 ha for real estate 
development.  The utility  shifting  along  the project  alignment was also done in  a time bound 
manner through MSEB. Environmental clearance was also obtained in timely manner baring a 
single instance of Ghat region where re-alignment had to be done due to objection from forest 
department. The project was completed before the stipulated time of 2 years 3 months [17,18]. 
10.8   Coimbatore Bypass Road Project: 
The Coimbatore Bypass was the first road project in South India on BOT basis. The road runs 
between Neelambur on the Salem side of NH-47 in Tamilnadu & Kerala, Madukkarai on the 
Palghat  side.  It involved construction of 28  Km  long two way bypass  road, the 32.2 m  new 
Athupalam Bridge across river Noyal, The railway over bridge at Chettipalayam and maintenance 
of the old bridge at Athupalam; all in the state of Tamilnadu. 
The bypass was expected to reduce congestion of traffic in Coimbatore city as well as Salem and 
Cochin highway running between Tamilnadu and Kerala. The shippers mostly export oriented 
units lying in the Cochin port for shipments, were other major beneficiaries in terms of time 
saving. 
The govt. of Tamilnadu planned for the bypass as early as in 1970 to ease the trafiic congestion in 
Coimbatore and in NH-47. However, due to paucity of funds the proposal was dropped at that 
time.  After,  1995  as  the  GOI  liberalized  the  policies  and  opened  up  road  sector  for  private 
investments, MOST invited tenders for the this bypass on BOT basis. As the project was not 
viable of its  own, after careful study GOI  widen the scope with  inclusion of the new bridge 
construction over river Noyal on NH-47.  
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The concession agreement for the integrated project involving the bypass and the bridge, was 
signed between MOST, Govt. of Tamilnadu and M/s L&T in October, 1997. L &T set up SPV 
namely L&T Transportation Infrastructure Limited. (LTTIL) with 100% equity shares. LTTIL 
implemented the project in BOOT basis, with revenue accruing directly to it.  The project was 
financed by share capital of Rs. 416 mn and term loan of Rs. 620 mn, with a debt equity ratio 
1.5:1. As per the concession agreement Tamilnadu government had to hold a minimum equity of 
26% at the end of 30 years. The debt financing was done by State Bank of India (SBI), L&T 
Finance, HUDCO, HDFC and IDBI. IDBI has sanctioned Rs.300 mn for the project in the form of 
infrastructure bonds. The loan was given in two tranches Rs. 150 mn each @ 15% interest each. 
Principal repayment was to start from eight years onwards. SBI has loaned Rs. 300 mn to the 
project and it has got a “liquidity support” arrangement with IDFC. 
The project which has reduced the overall distance by 2.5 km was completed in 22 months time. 
However, in the revenue collection front L & T has been facing lot of hurdles. The user first 
refused to pay the tolls at the old Athupalam Bridge. Tamilnadu government also backtracked and 
sought concession rates for state transport buses. It was willing to pay only Rs 0.50 per bus for 
making more than three trips as against planned Rs. 15 per bus per trip.  
The local transporter association also went to High court against toll rates and even after court 
directives they were not paying the tolls. Since, December 1998 L&T was unable to collect the toll 
which has resulted loss of Rs.74.1 mn as on June 2000.  This includes Rs. 11.4 mn out standings 
from Tamilnadu government towards reimbursement of their state transport buses.  
 
In view of the above L&T was forced to request the state government to invoke force majeure 
clause and to take over the project. It was also under pressure from the financial institutions to 
create additional securities and enter into a financial restructuring. L & T tried to enforce toll 
collection  strictly  with  the  help  of  local  police  too,  but  lack  of  whole  hearted  motivation  at 
governmental level, complicated the whole issue with political and vested interest [1].  
 
10.9   Source to Tap Integrated Management Water Supply Contract in LATUR: 
It was India‟s 1
st source to tap integrated management water supply scheme covering a total area 
of 32.56 sq. Kms with of population about 4 lakhs. The transmission network of the existing 
scheme included 3 water sources, 3 Water Treatment Plants (WTP) of 109 MLD capacity (2 were 
inefficient, total used capacity was only 35 MLD), 4 pump stations (one for raw water), 2 MBRs, 
10 ESRs, 1 GSR. A total of 31,000 house connections were available which would expect rise to 
80,000 as per survey. Some of the problem areas in the existing scheme were (i) Inequitable water 
supply, (ii) Poor demand coverage (Twice per week covering 80% of population), (iii) Poor asset 
maintenance, (iv)Poor management of water supply account (Improperly-maintained records-Poor 
collection efficiency), (v) Lack of meters, (vi) Many illegal connections, (vii) High NRW, (viii) 
Latur Municipal Corporation (LMC) was not able to meet O&M costs and (ix) Lack of customer 
services and complaint redressal system.  
In view of the above, Latur Municipal Corporation (LMC) formed a SPV named Latur Water 
Management Company in 2007. Maharashtra Jeevan Pradikaran (MJP) was chosen as the PMC. It 
was stipulate in the bidding criteria for paying of upfront premium by operator over a period of 10 
years for use of the assets. SPML Infra Ltd. has begged the contract in September 2007. The 
capital  cost  of  the  project  was  approximately  Rs.  130/-  Crores.  The  Management  Contract 
involves: (i) Operations & maintenance of water works for a period of 30 years (ii) Both bulk 
supply  and  distribution  networks,  (iii)  Manage  new  connections  including  collection  of 
applications, connection Charges, (iv) Manage regularisation of illegal connections and impose 
penalties  as  specified  by  MJP,  (v)  Implement  Hydraulic  Modelling  and  integrated  MIS,  (vi) 
Investments in metering, billing and collections for 10 years, (vii) Provide and install EEC marked 
water  meters  and  recover  expenditure  from  consumers  establishing  meter  workshops,  (viii)  
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Develop Customer Information System including 24x7 Call Centre, (ix) Bulk water transmission 
over 65 km and Distribution network over 600 km. 
 
Table 3: Tariff structure as fixed for the project 
Sl. No.  Consumer Category  2007-08 
2008-09 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
2011-12 
2012-13 
2013-14 
2014-15 
2015-16 
2016-17 
onwards 
1  Domestic (Rs.)  8.80  9.60  10.60  11.15  11.17  12.30 
2  Institutions (Rs.)  17.00  18.70  20.50  21.50  22.60  23.75 
3  Industrial & Commercial (Rs.)  40.00  42.00  44.00  46.20  48.50  50.90 
 
The proposed tariffs were to be increased in every 2 years. Collecting system-related data and 
reporting performance to MJP. The contract provides for Concessionaire paying a fixed sum per 
month to MJP. 
Now  a  properly  zoned,  optimized  network  automatically  reduces  existing  leakage,  minimises 
future leaks, makes leakage control easier and prolongs the effective lifespan of the network where 
as  the  zoning  analysis  carried  out  to  define  static  head  zones  (pressure  zones)  and  rezoning 
through remedial work was recommended. Zoning plan was drawn up and fieldwork commenced 
for commissioning of the new zones. The tariff structure for the project also includes Special 
concessions  offered  to  slums,  unmetered  connections  in  social  functions.  Some  of  the  other 
important features of the project were working for variable cost calculation based on actual costs 
incurred  by  LMC  over  a  period  divided  by  actual  volumes  of  water  produced  and  pumped. 
Escalation in variable costs would be borne by the client and not the operator. Old debts of LMC 
towards electricity and raw water would be cleared by LMC. Supply to SPV will not be stopped. 
So far this project is running smoothly and proving to be a successful model for other cities [25]. 
10.10   Nagpur Water Supply Scheme: 
When this project was conceived in 2006-07, the population of Nagpur was 2.5 million spread 
across 217 sq. Km which was set to double in next 25 years. The existing system had total pipe 
network 2,100 km in 10 Water Distribution Zones with 3 Raw Water Pumping stations and was 
catering a total 2,25,000 supply connections. The Water supply demand was 500 ML/day with 
losses 291 ML/day (54%). The operating cost at the WTP was Rs 3.30/ 1000 ltrs. and annual 
expenditure was Rs 106/- crores. Total demand from consumers in terms of monetary value was 
Rs 70.7 crores while recovery on water bill was Rs 50.0 crores. Thus, some major problem faced 
by the existing system such as Water Losses and UFW, Equitable distribution (Alternate day / 20 
hrs/day),  acute  shortage  for  Water  to  Slums  (inefficient  system).  Moreover,  Water  supply 
management during summer peak demand, Water network coverage and inadequacy of network, 
Capacity augmentation delay for future from limited water sources, Old and inefficient assets. 
These were coupled with  Low water tariff and Poor billing mechanism,  Lack of professional 
approach and Capital availability. 
Fortunately,  one  water  supply  project  under  PPP  was  already  underway  in  Nagpur  City  with 
15,000 Connection including 10 slum areas covering a population of 1.5-1.75 lakhs. The contract 
had got penalty & bonus for targets in UFW, quality, customer services and continuity of supply. 
The rehabilitation plan included (i) Replacement of 100% House service connection & Meters, (ii) 
Replacement of old conservancy GI pipe, (iii) Rehabilitation of Tertiary network, (iv) Hydraulic 
modelling as per Master plan, (v) Installation of new billing system & Customer Facility centre, 
(vi) Continuity of Supply 2 to 24 hours depending on area of supply 24x7 throughout the zones, 
(vii) Complaint handling within 3 days. 
Based on good results of the PPP water supply scheme thus far, proposal for entire city supply 
under PPP had been proposed and RFQ invited in Aug 2008 on behalf of the SPV created for the 
purpose, Nagpur Environmental Services Ltd. 10 bidders applied for Rs. 6.5 billion estimated cost 
project. For this purpose NMC has received Rs. 615 crores JnNURM sanctions for water supply 
expansion and would apply for Rs. 350 crores JnNURM grant for rehabilitation of distribution  
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network.  It  was  proposed  for  a  Performance-based  contract  for  25  years.  The  actual  funding 
pattern would be 70% grant and 30% from operator Orange City Water Private Limited (OCW). 
The proposal includes Proposal to collect full user charges for assets created under JnNURM and 
rationalization  of  tariff  for  full  cost  recovery  as  well  as  subsidy  to  urban  poor.  It  is  worth 
mentioning that JnNURM funding are for better viability and reduced capital cost. 
Concessionaire was to finance „Capex‟ to rehabilitate, repair, maintain and provide proper backup 
ownership for refurbishing and replacing water supply infrastructure assets with NMC. For that, 
exclusive rights of operating water supply services, including collection of water charges assigned 
to Concessionaire on behalf of NMC were proposed. 
However,  all  operational  risk  would  rest  with  Operator.  Concessionaire  will  retain  fee  in 
proportion of water quantum supplied & sold. Charge will depend on performance-related factors, 
limiting  physical  &  commercial  losses  below  certain  levels  and  ensuring  adequate  collection 
efficiency. Regulator in place also ensured consumers receive expected service level at reasonable 
cost and protect short term and long term interests of consumers. It provided certainty for public 
and  private  investment  and  enhanced  accountability  and  transparency  as  well  as  Control  the 
financial performance. Regulatory Office set as an SPV created by NMC .The other stakeholders 
are the participant in the constitution of the SPV. Initial set up and annual operating budgets 
approved by the Parties chargeable to the Operating Cash Flow. Key Staff selected on the basis of 
merit references. 
Regulator  was  to  appointed  for  5-year  (extensible)  contract.  Regulator  would  be  personally 
accountable for prejudice to the Parties. Public access to all resolutions and statements of the 
Regulator on the RO Web Site has to be displayed. Independent Regulatory Office would adjust 
rates, and monitor contract performance. Operator would be penalized on breach of its obligations 
under the Contract. 
Performance bond in favour of NMC was obtained. Operator got Power of Attorney to act against 
illegal connections and disconnect bad payers, thereby getting rid of illegal connections. This 
model has been quite successful and gradually being adopted for many other cities of the country 
[25]. 
10.11   Integrated SWM- Guwahati: 
Guwahati  Metropolitan  Area  (GMA)  covers  a  jurisdiction  of  264  sq.  km.  and  comprises  of 
Guwahati Municipal Corporation Area, North Guwahati Town Committee, Amingaon. As per 
2001 census itself its population was near 10 lakhs.  With the onset of population explosion in 
Guwahati, the quantum of MSW generation has also increased. The previous system has displayed 
an  array  of  problems,  including  low  collection  coverage,  irregular  collection  service,  open 
dumping, burning and handling issues among others. So it was felt to introduce a more scientific 
and integrated approach for this MSW of Guwahati. 
 
It was proposed that door to door collection will be implemented in closed / covered vehicles. 
These would be transported to the processing and disposal site at Boragaon. It was expected that 
there would be 125 incoming trucks to bring in 500 TPD of mixed MSW and about 12-15 trucks 
for bringing 57 TPD of biomass at the project site. The project site was to develop in a 24.12 ha of 
land and includes construction of 8 meter high retaining walls, soil fill with necessary slopes of 
1:3, over which processing plants and power plants would come up. It would have provisions for 
Refuse derived fuel plant (RDF plant) to handle 500 TPD of mixed MSW, Compost plant to 
handle 50 TPD of organic waste to produce manure. A power plant was proposed, boiler of which 
was to be fed with 180 TPD of RDF having calorific value of 2500-2800 Kcal/kg and 57 TPD of 
biomass. It was expected to generate 6MW power/ electricity. 
A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was formed namely Guwahati Waste Management Company 
Private Limited (GWMCL) to develop the project of MSWM system. It was agreed that equity 
shareholding of the consortium members/ sole applicant, in the issued paid up capital of the SPV  
 
         46    Journal of Management and Science           ISSN: 2249-1260 | e-ISSN: 2250-1819 | Vol.4. No.2 | June’2014                                                   
shall not be less than 76% during construction period and for 10 years following Commercial 
operation  date  and  51%  during  balance  remaining  operation  period.  M/s  Ramkey  Enviro 
Engineers  Ltd.  was  the  preferred  bidders  and  final  power  tariff  was  fixed  at  INR  4.00.  The 
concession period was fixed as 20 years from COD and construction period was 2 years maximum 
(Landfill and processing of waste 1 year each and power generation 2 year). Out of the estimated 
cost of Rs. 102 crore at the time of implementation, Rs. 36.34 crore was availed through a grant of 
JnNURM (70% of original DPR estimated cost) and rest (Rs.65.66 crore) developer was arranging 
@ 20% of the differential cost of DPR and actual implementation. There was agreed terms for 
monthly statements and bills of activities as well as disbursement procedure based on the above. 
Further, few additional support for capital raising by GWMCL was also agreed by GMC in terms 
of additional cells  of sanitary landfills, bills  for which need to  be raised along with  monthly 
tipping fee statement. GMC would pay Rs.130 per ton of waste for transportation with 4% annual 
escalations. 
In spite of having well defined obligations for all the parties, Termination and Force Majeure 
clauses,  defaulting  clauses  etc.  this  project  has  run  into  controversy  after  months  of  initial 
operations by the party concerned, leading to filing of PIL in the Guwahati High Court. As per the 
latest status the party has not  yet started up the RDF, Power Plant etc. which was originally 
scheduled within 2 years of operations [27]. 
10.12   Integrated SWM – Hyderabad: 
Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration (HUA) is the sixth largest in India with population of 57.5 lakhs 
in  the  year  2001  itself.  It  spread  over  an  area  of  778.17  sq.  km.    and  consist  of  Municipal 
Corporation  of  Hyderabad  (MCH),  12  peripheral  municipalities,  Secunderabad    Cantonment, 
Osmania University and few other areas. As the city is a one million plus covered under JnNURM 
scheme, it is entitled to get 35% grant from Government of India, 15% from grant from state and 
to arrange its own 50% to avail the benefits. The DPR for the MSWM system, estimated cost of 
Rs.434.51 crore which includes cost of tools, equipments, vehicles and construction of treatment 
and disposal facilities. 
To bring in the capital investment from the private sector and obtained efficiencies, the Greater 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) has floated the idea of engaging private developer on 
suitable PPP format for 50% capital investment requirement. 
The  key  features  of  this  PPP  model  was  25  years  of  concession  period  from  the  date  of 
commercial  operation  date  (COD).  The  concessionaire  has  certain  post-closer  obligations  for 
Landfill, which it shall continue for 15 years after the expiry of the active landfill period of 25 
years. 
The two stage bidding  process  was  adopted in which two firms  namely M/s  Ramkey Enviro 
Engineers Ltd.  and M/s Gujrat Environment  Ltd. were qualified after going through stringent 
qualifying  criteria.  Bidder  quoting  the  lowest  tipping  fee  was  to  be  selected.  The  various 
component of tipping fee were 40% for primary and secondary collection & transfer of waste to 
transfer station, 20% for transfer station management and transfer of waste to transfer station to 
processing facilities and rest 40% for treatment and disposal. M/s Ramkey was awarded the work 
based on their tipping fee of Rs.1449 per ton MSW.  There is a provision of annul increase of 5% 
(without compounding) to the tipping fee. In addition on, 1
st April each year base tipping rate to be 
adjusted based on variation in WPI. It is also agreed that this adjustment would reflect 60% of the 
inflation rate occurring  during the period. There were agreed clauses (with  provision for rate 
change or with original rates) for allocation of new sites for processing and disposal. 
The GHMC has agreed to arrange for the concessionaire 35% of  JnNURM grant from GOI as 
well as 15% share of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP), provide power connections to transfer 
stations,  treatment  and  disposal  facilities,  road  connectivity  to  the  above,  hand  over  existing 
infrastructure  to  the  concessionaire.  It  has  got  well  defined  dispute  resolution  mechanism, 
termination measures and role for independent Engineer and Auditor.   
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The concession agreement was signed on 21
st February 2009 and the integrated SMW project was 
supposed to take off in July 2009. However, before that the workers of GHMC went for strikes 
opposing the move inviting entry to private party in their operational domain. After initial put off, 
the government had issued a memo permitting pre-construction works in January 2010. Another 
issue that stuck the project implementation was refusal of GOI to release Rs. 152 crore under 
JnNURM on the ground that the state has already exhausted its allocation for seven years apart 
from additional allocation of Rs. 100 crore as per Planning Commission‟s directive. Good news is 
however that the state govt. is coming forward to bail out GHMC with additional funds if GOI 
does not allocate under JnNURM [27]. 
11.1   Salient findings of the case studies: 
Some  of  the  salient  features  of  the  above  case  study  projects  are  depicted  in  Table:4.  It  is 
interesting to see that most of the project concession period ranges from 20 years to 30 years and 
the  construction  period  are  normally  restricted  to  2  to  3  year  term  i.e.  within  10%  of  the 
concession period. However, Metro Rail projects do not reflect the same scenario, in which case 
construction is little prolonged. 
It is also revealed that there is no project specific Debt. Equity Ratio and same is chosen based on 
availability  and  arrangements  of  fund  from  various  sources.  However,  for  a  stable  financial 
structure  Debt.  Equity  Ratio  of  around  2.3:1  have  been  preferred  by  most  of  the  Project 
Developing agencies. 
The government, in its  part is still providing generous grants to Public infrastructure projects 
through various project  development  schemes like Jawaharlal  Nehru National  Urban Renewal 
Mission (JnNURM) and similar other schemes for Viability gap funding. It is worth mentioning 
that normal 20% VGF funding cap is enhanced to 40% in case of SARDP scheme of NHDP. 
 
11.2   Performance of the case study projects: 
It was also intended in the study to see the performance level of the case study projects with 
respect  to  six  critical  parameters  of  i)  Financial  Closer,  ii)  Land  Acquisition,  iii)  Other  Pre-
Constructional activities, iv) Demand Revenue Generation, v) Debt Service repayment and vi) 
Service Condition. A survey among some of the associated stack-holders of the case study projects 
have been conducted, taking not less than 10 samples per project. The respondents are advised to 
mark their choice in a five point Link cart scale for evaluating the success ratings. These rating are 
HS for Highly Success (more than 100% target achieved), S for Success (100% target achieved), 
SWS  for  Some  What  Success  (80-100%  target  achieved),  PP  for  Poor  Performance  (80-50% 
targeted achievements), F for failed (Below 50% target). The responses of the survey participants 
are further subjected to statistical t-test at 5% confidence level to see the significance in difference 
of opinion. Those opinions which stand on basis on results of above t-test with no significant 
difference have only been accepted for reporting purpose. Table5 depict the performance ratings 
for the case study projects based on the above responses obtained.   
 
12.  Looking Forward:  
The trends in Public Private Partnership (PPP) financing in India from the recent past has signalled 
few concerns viz, over dependency of Private parties on borrowings from commercial banks, risk 
of assets and liability miss-match of the banks for long term exposes, concession agreements not 
having provision of interest rate alteration etc. In number of occasions bank has to restructure their 
terms of lending on behest of government intervention or on fresh regulatory conditions. Few 
examples are Punjab National  Bank‟s restructuring in  case of loan to  Tamil  Nadu Electricity 
Board, Allahabad Bank‟s to TNEB and Rajasthan Electricity Boards, few other banks like Dena 
Bank, Indian overseas bank, Bank of India are also in process of consultation with concerned state 
utilities [19].   
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Well defined contractual  provisions  can always be helpful  with  pre-determined guidelines  for 
tackling  project  risk  eventualities.  NHAI  has  thus  set  the  following  for  concession  period 
adjustments in case of revenue shortfall due to reduction in traffic as in Table 6:        
     
Table5: Performance ratings of case study projects 
 
 
Performance parameters 
Financial 
Closure 
(FC) 
Land 
Acquisition 
(LA) 
Other Pre-
constructional 
activities 
(PCA) 
Demand & 
Revenue 
generation 
(DRG) 
Debt Service 
repayments 
(DSR) 
Service 
conditions 
(SC) 
Sl. 
No. 
Name of the 
Project             
1 
Terminal T3 of 
Delhi Airport 
HS  S  S  SWS  SWS  S 
2 
Cochin 
International 
Airport 
PP  SWS  SWS  S  SWS  S 
3 
East West Metro 
Corridor Project 
of Kolkata Metro 
PP  PP  SWS  -  -  - 
4 
Delhi Metro 
Project 
HS  S  HS  HS  HS  HS 
5 
Delhi Noida 
Bridge 
SWS  S  S  PP  PP  S 
6 
Vadodara Halol 
Toll road 
(State Highway 87 
of Gujrat) 
S  S  HS  PP  F  SWS 
7 
Mumbai - Pune 
Expressway 
SWS  S  HS  HS  S  S 
8 
Coimbatore 
Bypass 
SWS  S  S  PP  F  SWS 
9 
Source to Tap 
Integrated 
Management 
Water Supply 
Contract in 
LATUR 
SWS  -  S  S  SWS  S 
10 
Nagpur Water 
Supply Scheme 
S  S  S  S  S  S 
11 
Integrated SWM- 
Guwahati 
S  SWS  SWS  S  SWS  PP 
12 
Integrated SWM – 
Hyderabad 
SWS  S  S  SWS  SWS  SWS  
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                    HS                S                     SWS                     PP                   F 
 
Exhibit 8: Performance rating in Different front of Project Development for Terminal    T3 
of DIAL  
 
 
 
           HS                 S                   SWS                     PP                   F 
 
Exhibit  9:  Performance  rating  in  Different  front  of  Project  Development  for  Cochin    
International Airport  
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        HS                   S                    SWS                   PP                    F 
 
  Exhibit  10:  Performance  rating  in  Different  front  of  Project  Development  for    Mumbai    
Pune Expressway  
 
 
 
         HS                  S                     SWS                   PP                    F 
 
Exhibit 11: Performance rating in Different front of Project Development for Coimbatore 
Bypass  
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         HS                 S                      SWS                  PP                   F 
 
Exhibit 12: Performance rating in Different front of Project Development for Integrated 
SWM Guwahati  
 
 
 
 
        HS                  S                    SWS                    PP                    F 
 
Exhibit 13: Performance rating in Different front of Project Development for Integrated 
SWM Hydrabad  
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Table 6: Adjustment of revenues by NHAI for shortfall in traffic 
Type of Variation  Change  in  concession 
period 
Cap  on  Concession  period 
Variation 
Actual  Traffic  >  Target 
Traffic 
For  every  1%  shortfall, 
concession  period  increase 
by 1.5% 
 
           20% 
Actual  Traffic  >  Target 
Traffic 
For  every  1%  excess 
concession period reduction 
by 0.75% 
 
          10% 
 
On the other hand, the National Highways fee rules (2008) amended in 2011 provides for increase 
in base rates of tolls by 3% per year as well as upto an extent of 40% based on increase in WPI. 
Further, toll charges for new structures (bridges, tunnels) to be determined based on construction 
cost. All, these flexibilities incorporated in the pricing mechanism only to pay back due return on 
the investment [8]. 
However, an active bond market can definitely increase the flow of long term funds and reduce 
excessive reliance on banks. Indian corporate bond market, though one of the largest in Asia, is 
still  not  matured  enough  to  cope  up  the  frequent  changes  regulatory,  institutional  or  legal 
provisions. Nevertheless, government has provided a trading platform for the corporate bonds with 
a broad objective to invite sufficient funds for infrastructure developments in India. As part of that 
initiative, in 2011-12 union budget itself government had proposed to issue Rs30,000 crore tax 
free  bonds[20].  NHAI  has  issued  long  term  capital  gains  bonds,  which  is  non-convertible 
redeemable taxable bond in nature of debentures. But, in light of current global financial crisis the 
government has to explore other innovative ways to ensure adequate flows of (private) financing 
to PPP projects. Estimates also suggest that closing the gap in service provision and meeting 
future needs will require infrastructure investment in the range of 7-8% of GDP a year [10, 22]. 
Private sector role is crucial here itself.  
 
 
Exhibit 15: Total distribution of Debt, Equity and Governmental Grant in 104 case studies 
(WB) 
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The point of emphasis from the above discussion remains that if readily available finance can be 
arranged for the project at a lower rate of interest, the cost of development of the whole project 
will come down automatically to a substantial extent and in that case pricing or uses charge of the 
infrastructure  too  stands  at  a  lower  rate.  If  however,  the  financing  is  critically  disturbed,  the 
adverse effect will carry over to pricing part. In that case, pricing mechanism will have to be 
adjusted either in terms of enhancing the level of charges or in terms of extending the concession 
period. In most cases, second option is utilized. The cases in Delhi Noida toll Bridge, Cochin 
International Airport, Vadodara Halol Toll road did show us a trend in that line. 
The focal point emerging out from all the above is that infrastructure finance is non-recourse in 
nature. Nevertheless, with careful financial structuring and with a proper pricing mechanism one 
can certainly hope to get back affluent returns on infrastructure investments. 
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